Over the past several years, the issue of South China Sea has increasingly become much more intensified. The provocative attitudes of a number of China’s neighboring countries have contributed to the mounting tensions and pressures for China’s foreign policy decisions within the region.
ASEAN’s Position on the South China Sea Issue
When analyzing the South China Sea issue, domestic experts tend to approach the analysis from the various aspects of international law, sovereignty, economic interests and history. However, the peculiarity of the fact that the countries involved in the South China Sea dispute with China are mostly members of the ASEAN community. Despite of the great diplomatic and economic efforts that China has made since the end of the Cold War to improve its relationships within the region, such as the establishment of favorable trade regime such as the CAFTA. However, there’s little evidence that their advantageous economic relations with China will ameliorate the ASEAN countries’ confrontational stance against China over the South China Sea issues.
In July 2010, the South China Sea issue was presented in the Ministerial Conference of ASEAN Regional Forum unexpectedly and exceptional according to the norms of the conference, when concessions were demanded of China with regard to the issue by the interested ASEAN members. In November 2011, the Philippines raised a proposal on the South China Sea issue at the East Asia Summit. Its aim was to apply pressure on China by means of ASEAN. From the above we see the clear transformation of ASEAN from a vaguely neutral position to a much more apparent and antagonistic position over this issue and the change is significant.
There is no doubt that US played a great role in this transformation of ASEAN’s position. In July 2009, Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, disclosed the intention that US will “return to Asia” on an official visit to Thailand. On January 12, 2010, Hillary Clinton gave a speech titled “Regional Architecture in Asia: Principles and Priorities”, publically stating to the whole world that the focus of US foreign policy will gravitate back toward Asia, saying that the US was not just returning but it was here to stay. The key concern is to ask why the Southeast Asian countries while enjoying such close economic and trade connections with China could so rapidly change their attitudes as soon as US declared its intention to “return to Asia”. It seems that much of what China has tried to build in the regional relationships over the past ten years through strenuous diplomacy had been for not, Why?
The Limits of Economic Diplomacy
In recent years, economic diplomacy played the main role in China-ASEAN relationship. The rationale that founded an economic diplomacy was to foster economic cooperation and to enhance mutual interdependence, so as to improve relations and lower the possibility of military conflicts.
Guided by this policy, in November 2002, the two sides signed the Framework Agreement On Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Between The People’s Republic Of China And The Association Of South East Asian Nations. In January 2010, CAFTA was formally established, signifying the acceleration of economic and trade cooperation between China and ASEAN.
According to graph 1, China has become the biggest trading partner of ASEAN, with trade volumes surpassing the EU, US, Japan, and South Korea. According to graph 2, for more than ten years the volume of trade between China-ASEAN on the whole has been on the increase. The total China-ASEAN trade in 2010 is about ten times that of 1999.
Graph 1: trade share of ASEAN’s major trade partners in 2009
( the statistics source: http://www.aseansec.org/22122.htm)
Graph 2: China to ASEAN trade amount 1997-2010
(Statistics source: 1997-2009 data from China statistical yearbooks 2010 data from China General Administration of Customs)
To further illustrate the development of China-ASEAN economic relationship and the effect that this has had on the China-ASEAN relationship, we present the following analysis bases on the findings of Gallup Poll results.
From table 1, we can see that economic diplomacy was conducive to the improved image of China within ASEAN countries. Among all the members of ASEAN, the proportion of people that held the positive view of “having a good relationship with China is a good thing” were close to or higher than 50%, while the proportion of people that held a more negative views of China were no more than 30% and in many instances much less. In countries that have relatively large disputes with China over the South China Sea issue, such as Vietnam, 59% of people held the view that “having a good relationship with China is a good thing” while only 6% of the people held a negative view of China. These numbers are indicative of the success of China’s economic diplomacy within the region and reflective of the positive impact on China-ASEAN relationship.
From table 2, the Gallop results of 2007 showed that China and the US are nearly equals in a comparative assessment of their leadership in the ASEAN countries. Except for a few cases, there was not a significant difference in the perception of Chinese and American leadership in the various ASEAN countries surveyed in this comparison. We may infer that China’s influence within the ASEAN countries may parallel that of the US.
Table 1: 2007 Gallup Poll results on relationship with China
Table 2: 2007 Gallup Poll results on the leadership of China and US.
Table 3: 2009 Gallup Poll results on the leadership of China and US
However, by 2009 a similar Gallup Polls survey produced significantly different results. From table 3, we can see that a majority of Asian countries investigated supported the leadership of the US more than China. The contrast is accentuated by the perceptible drop in the proportion of people supporting China’s leadership. It is apparent that the US policy of returning to Asia produced significant impact. In June 2010, military forces from 14 countries, including the US, Australia, Japan, India, South Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia, took part in the Rim of the Pacific Exercise. In July 2010, at the ASEAN Regional Forum held in Vietnam, the US for the first time announced its support in favor of Vietnam over its territorial and maritime disputes with China, including Vietnam’s claims in the Xisha and Nansha islands. Consequently this has served to improve US popularity within the region. At the same time, it is worthwhile for China to consider the reasons and underlying causes of its poor defense against an interloping US presence despite the many years of Chinese effort in the conduct of economic diplomacy. China is still the largest trading partner of ASEAN, but how can we explain the dramatic shift in the ASEAN position toward China in the context of a more proactive US diplomatic strategy within the region.
In view of the above statistical analysis, it is necessary that China should consider the limits of it economic diplomacy in South East Asia. If merely focusing on improvements in bilateral trade, China has been rather successful in its relationship with ASEAN. However, economic diplomacy is not the final answer to maintain positive relationships.
First, economic diplomacy promotes dialogue and cooperation in the arena of low politics, but the cooperation at this level cannot be extended with alacrity into the issue areas of high politics where core national interests are on the line. In post World War II Europe，France and Germany advanced the establishment of a unified European Community by the Treaty of European Coal and Steel Community, which would later evolve into the European Union. However we must take note of the historical international power structure that made this cooperation possible. In the Cold War, France and Germany were both similarly confronted with the military threat of Soviet Union and the political leadership of US. To reclaim their positions as major powers, France and Germany had to unite. That was the primary cause of the two countries’ push for development in their bilateral relationship, politically and economically. However, the international power structure today is much different than the Cold War era. Since the end of the Cold War, the US is the only superpower, and China as a rising power is sometime a competitor of the US but never an enemy. In the current situation, it is more beneficial to the ASEAN state to bargain with both sides than to merely strengthen its relationship with China.
Second, the strengthening of bilateral economic and trade relations may nurture the favorable impression of counterparts, but it does not necessarily translate into the advance in prestige. When study the above Gallup survey, we take note of a strange phenomenon. We see that Vietnam, a country that has been most vocal and in strong opposition against China over the issue of South China Sea, still held a generally positive view of its relationship with China. As evidenced in table 1, 59% of Vietnamese interviewed in 2007 regarded having a good relationship with China as a good thing and the contrary opinion was only 6%. According to table 2, the same year 35% of Vietnamese interviewed supporting Chinese leadership, higher than the 29% in support of American Leadership. From table 3, two year later in 2009, when many Asian countries tended toward greater support for the US, there was still 31% of Vietnamese that preferred the performance of Chinese leadership over the 26% of people that approved American leadership. How may we explain this seemingly irregular evidence? The answer may rest in the fact that economic diplomacy has its limits. Though bilateral economic and trade cooperation strengthens the impression of China in the political imagination of the Vietnamese, this does not mean that Vietnam would be made more compliant and yield to China in core issues of sovereignty.
In order for China to retain its leadership in Southeast Asia, it will require China to foster not only “good impressions” but prestige, the form of prestige that would motivate neighboring countries to concede willingly, and not to offer repeat challenges to China’s bottom line over issues of sovereignty. Historically the Chinese Han and Tang dynasty’s economic and trade relations with neighboring countries were not significant. However, China ascended to a leading role in Southeast Asia nonetheless by defeating the formidable Hun and Turkic forces at its borders. It was due to such displays of power that no country in the Southeast Asia attempt to challenge China over core issues of sovereignty?
The Strategy of China
From the analysis above, it is clear that China’s current economic diplomacy policy would not provide a solution to the issue of South China Sea. Any possible future solution would necessitate a transformation in China’s strategic thinking with regard to this region as well as a reformulation of its strategic approach that should encompass an overall assessment of all the diverging interests. The writer will offer some suggestions to this effect.
When determining a course of action in China’s bilateral disputes over the solidarity of its borders, stronger measures may and perhaps should be taken, using to their full potential policy tools such as trade reduction, slowing outbound investments, and other forms of indirect or even direct economic sanctions. If other countries would irrationally persist in violating China’s principle and core interests, China may hold military exercises and actions for the purpose of deterrence, to demonstrate the capacity and resolve in the protection of Chinese interests. Despite the harshness of such measures if deftly managed we may prevent the relevant countries from behaving arbitrarily determined unilateral action, as well as to set down advantageous condition for bilateral negotiations. This strategy may curb the proclivity of ASEAN countries to undermine China’s position by way of capitalizing on the support of the US prestige, but such a course is not without hazard. The relationship between China and ASEAN may see rapid deterioration. The ASEAN countries would not challenge Chinese interests directly without assurances of success, but would no doubt promote the China Threat Theory in the world community. As tensions over China’s rise escalates and its vilification gains popularity, China must then deal with a much more inhospitable international environment. Even the threat of armed conflict may quickly become an ominous possibility.
China should to reflect on the practical values of its participation within international organizations. This participation may not necessarily lead to congenial conditions for China to protect its interest. It may instead create burdensome restrictions that limit the state’s freedom of action, the multilateral framework of the 10+3 Asian community provides an apt example. In the past China sought to improving relations with ASEAN to break free of its imposed isolation at the close of the Cold War. Circumstances have lent themselves to a consensus among ASEAN members in their purposed opposition to China’s position and obfuscate the issue in South China Sea. Chinese leaders now face the difficult circumstance of one against many. In order to assume a stronger position to engage ASEAN members individually on a bilateral basis as equal sovereigns, China’s withdraw from the 10+3 framework should not be completely off the table. If China would move to withdraw, it may caution the rest of the ASEAN countries to reflect on their own policies, in other cases it may even disrupt the continued provocation. The ASEAN countries most likely would not prefer to strain their relations with China beyond repair. The situation would then lend itself to the possibility of certain countries to attempt to maintain or even improve bilateral relations with China out of self-interest and with eye to greater development. Furthermore, China might try to focus its favorable foreign policy treatment to particular friendly member of the ASEAN community, a tactical maneuver such as that employed by Zhang Yi of the Warring States period, which may serve to mitigate to an extent the issue consensus among the group. The Qin state had dissolved a far worse situation at that time in the form of a “vertical integration” of six states all hostile toward the state of Qin, a much more dangerous circumstance since it was both a strategic and military alliance. However, Zhang Yi sought out the states of Qi and Chu as the weakest links within the hostile alliance, and broke the “vertical integration” by effectively conducting a horizontal foreign policy. Drawing on historical precedence, China may seek to promote a much more integrated economic cooperation and even form military alliances with the ASEAN countries that are not in dispute with China, to garner their support for China’s position. As for those countries that harbor claims that erode China’s core interests, bilateral negotiation tools such as trade reduction and military deterrence may be leveraged in China’s favor. By this way we may resolve the present circumstance of a united stance among the ASEAN against China’s core interests and “subdue the opponent without conflict.”
Sun Zi in the The Art of War wrote, “Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on him.” The US position and influence may be espied behind the South China Sea issue. Even if and when China resolves the South China Sea issue successfully, there may be other similar issues perhaps in the East China Sea and so on emerging to contest China’s interest. The issue at heart is that the rapid rise of China has aroused antagonistic sentiments from the US which may lead to a policy of containment. To solve the South China Sea issue, China must have a global strategy.
In the Cold War during the 1970, the US was disadvantaged in its competition with Soviet Union, accompanied by failure in the Vietnam War, and internal social distress. However, no more than 20 years later Soviet Union collapsed and the US achieved victory without resorting to direct confrontation. One of the crucial reasons behind this achievement was the establishment of Sino-American strategic relationship which fundamentally changed the order of the international arena. The conditions China faces now are quite similar. The US is endorsing and implementing a containment strategy with regard to China by ramping up its presence in East Asia, from Japan to South Korea to ASEAN. Currently China has one strong partner in Russia. It behooves China to enhance and develop its political and military cooperation with Russia, as well as to focus more strategic resources and attention to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), though such measures alone are not enough to reverse China’s disadvantage. China has neglected to give enough emphasis to its relationship with the EU, if developed would prove a strategically powerful alliance. The EU is usually regarded as the US’ ally in the Chinese subconscious, but we should note that EU has also pursued a leading position in the world community since the end of the Cold War, which inevitable would trouble the US. For instance in 2003, France, Germany, Russia and China voiced their opposition to the US invasion of Iraq, which has worked to detract from the strength of US hegemony and its soft power resources. If China made a serious effort to improve relations with the EU and Russia, then the strategic focus of the US will return to the Atlantic. Consequently this would alleviate much of the pressure China currently bears in East Asia. Presently, the European debt crisis has provided an opportunity for China, because the EU burdened with crisis and mounting debt would actively court China’s assistance. If China would lend a helping hand to the distressed EU economy, the resultant enhancement in the Sino-EU relationship may prove mutually beneficial. That in turn would aid a great deal toward a peaceful solution for China and its neighbors over the South China Sea issue. If China offers aid it would be interpreted as an honorable act that would likely elevate China’s prestige.
In the process of its rapid rise, China must remain vigilant and prudent constantly. There have been many examples of rising powers that have failed to endure in the course of history. Determining how best to solve the issue over the South China Sea as well as to clear the obstacles in China’s rise, is one of the vitally important tasks for the Chinese academia.
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